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DISCUSSION - SESSION FOUR
The comments made by the speakers are their own personal remarks and do not
necessarily represent the official view of any organization or agency they represent.
MR. WILLIAM JENNINGS: I would like to direct one question to the airline
industries representatives particularly. It would appear that much of the emphasis
we have had in the program so far on safety has been the operational aspect. When
it comes to informing the passenger of prospective danger that he might encounter
and evacuation procedures, particularly, it appears that in the briefings given,
when you are trying to tranquilize the passengers about these anxieties, the
approach, and the advertising as well, seem to be directed to the concept of better
food and drink service from your stewardesses, rather than in selling safety in
hopes of gaining better passenger acceptance.
MR. JOHN STEPHEN: Your question is a very good one, and one of which
the industry, of course, is profoundly aware. There are two philosophies: one, to
assure the passenger and invite attention to the more reassuring aspects of the
flight. The opposite viewpoint, I suppose, is best epitomized by a recent airline
who retained a certain well-known advertising agency to try the "white knuckle
approach" which would discuss the issue quite frankly with the passenger and
attempt to deal with it on the basis of laughing it off. This approach did not
work; in fact, the airline involved is now merged with another one, and the
advertising agency involved is now selling spaghetti. I would agree, speaking
seriously, that there is an obligation on an airline to warn the passenger in any
way it appropriately can, as to not only the expectation of the passenger to have
the ultimate safety precautions taken by the airline, but such negative factors as
are appropriate under the circumstances. Certainly that would extend to notice
of limitation for liability, for example, which the airline's practice has fallen into
some disfavor in the case of the Civil Aeronautics Board which has, as you know,
imposed special requirements of its own over and above those previously existing,
for instance, in the Warsaw Convention. Even here it is recognized that you have
not really told the passenger a great deal when you have told him in the kind of
language that all of the various notices involved tell him; the Warsaw Conven-
tion prescribes no text; the CAB regulation authorizes a text of notice; the
Montreal Agreement prescribes the text of the notice. Then airlines in some
instances have notices over and above that, such as the famous red bold face
print on the front of the Alitalia ticket which never did get to the attention
of the Supreme Court. Be that as it may, the airlines do, perhaps not so much in
their advertising, but in their traffic practices, attempt to give passengers notifi-
cation of those aspects of their flight which a passenger is entitled to have some
special notice of. In their day-to-day dealings with the public, admittedly, the
traffic and sales people on the airline's side are probably less enthusiastic about
this kind of notification than are the operations and other people in the airlines
business. It is simply felt not to be conducive to the good of the passenger's state
of mind or the airline's operations if, in effect, you put the notorious medical
insignia, skull and crossbones, behind the traffic counter. In fact, this very sug-
gestion was made to the CAB at the time it prescribed its Warsaw notice.
Actually, what you will do is cause a great deal of damage, not only to air
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transport, but you will not accomplish anything by it, because those people who
are going to fly, will ultimately fly in any event. If you discourage people travel-
ing by stressing the risk aspect, you have not really accomplished anything for the
good of the passenger.
MR. JENNINGS: I would like to make one brief comment on that, a sugges-
tion that might date back to ATA. Many, many dollars are being spent on in-
flight movies and entertainment. Possibly a one or two minute film strip on how to
open those small emergency over-wing exits and other appropriate instructions
might be given in the movie or television film for the advice of the passengers
who are aboard that flight. I believe American had a decompression with 103
aboard, and only three of the passengers knew how to apply their masks.
MR. STEPHEN: That is a very constructive suggestion. One that has had a
lot of talk.
SPEAKER UNIDENTIFIED: Mr. Stephen, that is a little hard to understand
because the hostess makes an announcement at the beginning of every flight, which
is required by FAA regulation, on how to use the oxygen mask, under those
circumstances. Also, she gives notices to the effect that the seat pocket at the
head of every seat gives a detailed description of the emergency equipment and
evacuation exits on every aircraft. It is a little hard to understand how passengers
would not pay any attention till the docking. Or if they did, they just did not
listen, or they did not read the cards. Actually, they do not read the cards, but
they are there in each seat.
MR. EUGENE JERICHO: Mr. Peters, you have outlined for us the growing
list of litigation against the FAA, both as a defendant and as a potential co-defend-
ant in these aviation accidents. We have heard about the huge expansion efforts
of the FAA and its everexpanding involvement in controlling air traffic control.
My question to you, sir, is one that causes me genuine concern, and that is,
whether it is, in your opinion, realistic and proper for the FAA and the National
Transportation Safety Board to, in fact, investigate itself, when more often than
not, it has, for instance, the exclusive access to some of the more vital facts and
information concerning its own concept.
MR. CHARLES J. PETERS: I think those of you who recall Mr. Allen's
description of investigative process will understand that in this investigation of
the accident there are interested parties represented in the investigative groups.
I think that the Board procedure by which the Board actually investigates the
FAA, as well as the air carrier and anybody else that might be involved, is a very
good one, because it does have the interested parties working to expose any other
party that they think might be at fault. The Board can sit back at the hearing
in some of these areas and let the parties examine each other's witnesses. In the
investigative process each expert on each investigative group has the opportunity
to suggest areas of inquiry. I think that it is a good investigative process. I have
found time and time again in litigation the discovery proceedings go on for a long
time; the various plaintiffs might bring a lot of experts and spend quite a bit
of money on it. I very seldom find them coming up with facts in addition to the
facts that the board uncovered in its investigation. Now, when you say the FAA
investigates itself, I think we have to investigate ourselves just like the air
carrier investigates itself, and the manufacturer investigates itself. Every large
employer wants to know if his employees are doing their jobs. I do not know if
that is completely responsive, sir, but I think that it is my position.
MR. JERICHO: It is responsive. My only thought was whether it would be
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advisable or practical for some other agency, independent in some way, to be in
some way able to investigate the FAA as a potential responsible party.
MR. PETERS: I do not know how you can get NTSB more independent than
it is. I can assure you they do not look at our action leading up to any accident
from a friendly point of view. They are after the facts, and if it is the FAA that
has the facts, they get them.
MR. JERICHO: It just occurred to me you are both working for the same
boss.
MR. PETERS: No, that is not so. The Secretary of Transportation is head of
the Department of Transportation, but he cannot exercise any authority over the
National Transportation Safety Board. They are there for housekeeping purposes,
much as the CAB was with the Department of Commerce years ago.
End of Wednesday afternoon discussion.
